Your first port of call in all matters concerning judicial review applicationsFind Out More
A Practical Guide£74.00
A handbook which aims to be a first port of call in all matters concerning judicial review applications, whether in civil or criminal proceedings.
- Published: March 2012
- Edition: 2nd
- Format: Paperback
- ISBN: 9781846612954
- Authors/Editors: Jude Bunting, Hugh Southey QC, Amanda Weston
- Category: Public Law and Regulation, Immigration and Human Rights Law, Family Law, PI and Civil Litigation Law, Criminal Law, Construction, Housing and Property Law, Education Law
This new edition has been significantly amended to take account of the following developments in law and practice, including:
- Development of the Unified Tribunal system with transfers of judicial reviews
- Regionalisation of Administrative Court
- Clear development of mistake of fact as a mistake of law
- Increasing understanding of the impact of the Human Rights Act
- Limitations upon judicial review in the context of immigration
- Ongoing case-law developments
- Changes to Appeals (CPR Pt 52)
- Developments in costs and funding
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
Table of Statutory Instruments
Table of European and International Material
Law and Practice
- The Scope of the High Court’s Jurisdiction to Consider Claims for Judicial Review
- Grounds of Challenge in Judicial Review Claims
- Matters to be Considered Before Applying for Judicial Review
- Steps to be Taken Before Applying for Judicial Review
- Procedure for Bringing a Claim for Judicial Review in the High Court
- Jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal to Consider Judicial Review
- Orders for Interim Relief available from the Administrative Court
- During a Judicial Review Claim
- Relief Available at the End of Judicial Review Proceedings
- Appeal Procedure
Forms and Precedents
Legislation, Guidance and Protocol
Phillip Taylor MBE and Elizabeth Taylor of Richmond Green Chambers
"Criminal Lawyers huff and puff a lot about the judicial review, but often take their frustrations no further due to a lack of understanding of the remedies and the scope of this specialist jurisdiction. Once again this is a general tect explaining with great clarity the procedural processes that must be gone through. The books greatest strength though it that whilst the text is academically rigorous, the intention was clearly to produce a book that will practically assist the non-specialist in this field - the authors have succeeded and this should be first port of call for all thoses considerinng this route of challenge. Highly recommended."
Andrew Keogh, Crimeline Updater
There is a corresponding wealth of books on the doctrines of modern public law; but there remains surprisingly little in the way of practice books. Part of the reason is that this is a field in which practice and theory are almost inseparable. What kind of official or body, for example, is open to judicial review? Where is the interface between policy guidance and individual decision-making? Can a policy be attacked for stultifying decisions? Can a decision be attacked for conforming – or for not conforming – to a policy?
For public administrators and their lawyers the problems are migrainous. For their challengers the possibilities are numerous, but the constraints and obstacles are both real and necessary. Behind the rules and principles lies a network of legal controls, most but not all put in place by the judges. Time limits are very tight; disclosure is not merely a litigant’s obligation but a public duty; remedies are discretionary.
There is in addition a unique relationship between the parties, one of which is always, in one guise or another, the state. It is a fundamental principle of the common law that the state comes before the courts on an equal footing with the individual. But this is not the whole story, for in public law litigation the state’s object is not, or not necessarily, to win the particular case: it is to ensure that the law is correctly understood and developed. One of the striking features of my 25 years of public law litigation at the Bar was the preparedness of the successive Treasury Devils (from Nigel Bridge to John Laws) to forgo points which might win their case but would distort the law or retard its development. Another was their abstention from taking technical objections – for instance to the introduction of late arguments – unless these placed them in genuine difficulties: once again the object was to get the law straight, not necessarily to win the case.
One consequence of this forensic culture has been, I think, a more principled and less uneven development of modern public law than would otherwise have been the case. That is not to say that there are not anomalies and difficulties; but they tend to arise from the merits of individual cases less often than in some other fields of law. At the same time, public law has attempted – for example in developing the principles of legitimate expectation – to bring law more closely into line with justice. Thus fairness and proportionality tend now to be invoked where quasi-judicial decisions and rationality were once argued.
But it’s no use having a good case if your tackle is not in order. The practicalities of judicial review may at times resemble an assault course, but they are logical and, in general, necessary. They are also interwoven with law. In Judicial Review: A Practical Guide practitioners on both sides of the fence (as well as the growing band of litigants in person) will find what they need to get their show on the road and to keep it running.
The Rt Hon Sir Stephen Sedley
Illegality is usually used to describe circumstances where decision-makers fail to direct themselves properly about the law. As Lord Scarman stated:
‘It is now settled law that an administrative or executive authority entrusted
with the exercise of a discretion must direct itself properly in law.'
In practice, the Administrative Court regularly hears challenges that seek to argue that inferior courts and other decision-makers have misconstrued statutes that govern aspects of their work.
For example, in a criminal context, the Administrative Court can consider a challenge that seeks to argue that the statute that gives rise to an offence has been wrongly construed by an inferior court. It can also consider a challenge relating to statutes that govern the admission of evidence or whether a prosecution is time-barred. Of course, not only courts may misdirect themselves regarding the law. For example a failure of a local authority to correctly direct itself regarding the meaning of a statute providing for the payment of grants to students was unlawful.
The HRA 1998 has increased the scope for challenge on the basis that a decision-maker has acted unlawfully because s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a manner that violates the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, the Administrative Court may be required to make findings of fact in order to determine whether the European Convention has been violated, despite the normal reluctance to make findings of fact.
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