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‘In determining the husband's domicile of origin it is therefore necessary to determine Bikas's domicile as at the moment of the husband's birth in September 1971.'This is because, as Moor J made explicit in Divall v Divall:
‘Everyone at birth receives a domicile of origin, which is attributable by operation of law. A legitimate child takes her father's domicile.'While this is absent from Arden LJ's summary, r 15 of The Conflict of Laws clearly states that a ‘legitimate' child takes the domicile of their father. A child of unmarried parents, on the other hand, is assumed to have the domicile of their mother. This is why the husband in Ray v Sekhri focussed on the fact that his father retained a desire to return to India, and not on the fact that his mother strongly wished the family to remain in the UK (and got her way).
‘In my view, where the vulnerable adult like P has as a matter of fact been living in one place and only one place for many years, that will almost inevitably compel the conclusion that it is his ordinary place of residence. It is not, in my view, legitimate to avoid that common sense conclusion by the application of an artificial rule which effectively gives no weight to the fact of residence at all.'It could well be argued that this development in the law in relation to the ordinary residence of incapacitated adults should be applied to the question of their domicile.
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