All your resources at your fingertips.Learn More
'It seems to me that at para 60 of Re B (Lady Hale and Lord Toulson) do helpfully indicate a test when they said "the real question is whether the circumstances are such that this British child requires that protection". That has an echo in the words of Lord Sumption at para 87 where he referred to "... a pearl from which the courts should 'rescue' the child" ...'
A major source of information for practitioners and professional advisers dealing with legal...
This conference will provide you with a comprehensive update on the latest changes Copthorne Tara Hotel, Kensington, LONDON
'49. The courts having clearly held that the vulnerable adult jurisdiction is indistinguishable from the parens patriae jurisdiction in relation to children, it seems to me that exactly the same approach as that analysed and discussed by the Supreme Court in Re A and Re B should inform my approach to the present case. The jurisdiction based on nationality must apply no less to an adult than to a child. As Bennett J asked rhetorically in Re G (An Adult) (Mental Capacity: Court's Jurisdiction)  EWHC 2222 (Fam) at para 111 (quoted with obvious approbation by Munby J in Re SA at para 65):
"Why, then, should G, now an adult, be worse off than she would have been had the matters arisen if she was a child?"
50. If it is appropriate to extend the protection of this court to a British citizen abroad when that person is 17, it cannot be less appropriate to do so just because he attains 18 or 21 or, indeed, any other age. The focus must be upon whether the citizen requires that protection and upon the peril from which he may need to be rescued; not upon whether he happens to be above or below the age of 18. Further, although there is a statutory framework (including the provisions of EU Council Regulations) which regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to children, there is none in relation to adults. I do not suggest that for that reason the court should be any less cautious or circumspect in relation to its exercise of the jurisdiction to protect adults rather than children, but there is no obvious reason why it should be even more so. Mr Scott-Manderson suggested in his final written schedule of balancing factors that the required caution is even greater in the case of an adult than of a child. When I asked why, he said because the use of the inherent jurisdiction based on nationality in the case of adults is very rare. It is; but just because it is very rare does not seem to me to require that even greater caution is required. "Great caution" or "extreme circumspection" means what it says, whether the person concerned is a child or an adult. To exhort even greater or more extreme caution or circumspection is, frankly, to succumb to hyperbole.'
'crystal clear that, apart from requiring her attendance before me at that hearing, if she has indeed voluntarily returned to Wales and England, I do not make any order whatsoever against Amina herself. The purpose is not to order her to do anything at all. Rather, it is to create conditions in which she, as an adult of full capacity, can exercise and implement her own independent free will and freedom of choice. To that end, I will give further consideration with counsel after this judgment to what mechanism can now be established to enable her freely to state, if that be her own free decision and choice, that she does not now wish to avail herself of the opportunity provided by my decision and this order to return to Wales or England.'